OECD Arrangement
The OECD Arrangement (Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits) is a gentlemen's agreement among its Participants that provides a framework for the orderly use of officially supported export credits and seeks a level playing field so exporters compete on quality and price rather than on the most favourable official financing terms. Developed in the OECD framework, it took effect in April 1978 for an indefinite duration. It is not an OECD Act, though it receives administrative support from the OECD Secretariat. The consolidated text is republished as amendments land; the current version is effective as of 22 January 2026.
OECD Arrangement disciplines on bank export finance desks
Banks and export credit agency teams use the Arrangement as the rulebook for medium- and long-term official support among Participants. The text applies to official support provided by or on behalf of a government for exports of goods and/or services, including financial leases, with a repayment term of two years or more. It does not apply to military equipment or agricultural commodities. Official support may take the form of:
- export credit guarantee or insurance (pure cover)
- official financing support through direct credit, refinancing or interest-rate support
- any combination of the above
The Participants are currently Australia, Canada, the European Union, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, Türkiye, the United Kingdom and the United States. National programmes such as UKEF buyer credit facilities and EXIM guaranteed or direct loans implement the Arrangement ceilings in their product rules.
Core financial terms
Chapter II limits financial terms and conditions. Purchasers must make down payments of at least 15% of export contract value at or before the starting point of credit. Except for permitted local-cost provisions, Participants shall not provide official support above 85% of the export contract value; official support for local costs is capped at 40% of export contract value for Category I countries and 50% for Category II countries.
The general maximum repayment term is 15 years, reduced to 12 years for power plants that are not eligible under the climate change or nuclear sector understandings and extended to as much as 22 years for qualifying climate-friendly transactions. These figures reflect the 2023 modernisation package, which lengthened tenors, broadened climate coverage and reformed the CIRR system.
Further disciplines cover CIRR interest-rate floors for official financing support (Annex XII), risk-based minimum ECA premium rates linked to the OECD country risk classification and buyer risk categories (calculated under Annex VI), notification and matching procedures, and rules on tied aid and trade-related untied aid. Four sector understandings adapt the general terms for climate change, nuclear power plants, civil aircraft and ships.
The former standalone project finance annex is gone from the current text. Its flexibility now sits in Article 13: where the amortisation schedule does not match the obligor's or project's free cash flow, repayment profiles may be tailored within constraints, with no single repayment or six-month series of principal payments above 30% of the credit, a first principal instalment no later than 24 months after the starting point of credit, and a weighted average life of the repayment period no greater than the larger of 65% of the repayment term or six years.
References to older annex numbering, such as project finance under a former Annex VII, no longer match the January 2026 text, where Annex VI carries the minimum premium rate calculation.
Soft-law status and desk consequences
Because the Arrangement is a gentlemen's agreement, compliance is political and reciprocal rather than litigated as a treaty obligation. Participants notify terms, may match competing offers, and rely on transparency to police breaches. For credit desks, the practical effect is hard: an Arrangement-covered buyer credit or pure-cover commitment that exceeds permitted tenor, support percentage or pricing is out of bounds for Participant ECAs, regardless of commercial appetite. Non-Participant official finance sits outside that mutual discipline and is assessed under separate mandate and WTO subsidy analysis.